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Abstract 
A deterministic model for control of a bioterrorist epidemic in a 
large nonhomogeneous population is presented. Primary considerations in 
model development are the representation of a large nonhomogeneous 
population of individuals and the implementation of the model for quick 
numerical execution. The model represents the effect of mass  
pre-vaccination and mass vaccination during the epidemic. It is recognized 
that the vaccination can result in life threatening complications. The model 
also represents the effect of tracing and quarantining as control options. 
The model has been implemented in Java for a Web-based educational 
tool. Numerical examples (pp. 12-15) illustrate possible behavior of 
populations exposed to such a disease as smallpox. Various disease 
controls such as vaccination and case tracing are studied. 
 
1. Background, Overview, and Emphasis 
 For several years, especially since the Twin Towers and anthrax attacks, 
bioterrorist acts such as deliberate epidemic initiation have been recognized as possible 
serious threats to the U.S. homeland and to allies. Consequently, studies have been 
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initiated and pursued of (Red—bioterrorist) initiation, propagation, and possible (Blue) 
detection, identification, and control. 
 There are many scientific articles on Red bioterrorist opportunities and possible 
CONOPS, and on the effect of various Blue detection and control strategies: methods of 
detection, identification, and interruption of the cumulative effects of a virulent and 
destructive epidemic. This paper describes mathematical models for Red attacks and Blue 
attempts to achieve control. The paper by Kaplan, Craft, and Wein (2002) espoused mass 
vaccination. A recent monograph, H. T. Banks and C. Castillo-Chavez (2003), (denoted 
B&C), is a useful introduction to the field; the reference listing of this paper provides 
further background, but is not totally comprehensive. The present presentation  
(G&J, 2004) has the objective of broadening and extending models and approaches like 
those in B&C, and elsewhere. Like the latter, we concentrate on characterization of 
epidemics, emphasizing the effects of: 
• Nonhomogeneous mixing of infectious with susceptible individuals; 
• Vaccination effects and efficacy (and risks) as a control option for Blue; 
• Tracing and isolation (quarantining) as a control option for Blue; 
• Value of information to Blue in attempting to thwart terrorist endeavors to 
create true epidemics (or pseudo-epidemics introduced for low-cost deception 
as “decoys”). Value and use of intelligence information and/or  
syndromic surveillance; 
• Counter-Bioterrorism as a Command-and-Control (C4ISR) problem; 
• The (Blue) resource requirements for detection, prevention, and 
mitigation/treatment of disease epidemics, possibly a combination of different 
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types, some intended to disable security forces guarding water, electricity, 
transportation, and financial assets. 
The approach of this paper is to create simple mathematical models for various 
situations, here deterministic or “fluid” (but stochastic-probabilistic, or a combination to 
appear later), and to use these models to provide “user-friendly” graphical/numerical 
tools for the use of health-care professionals, administrators, and other decision makers 
whose training and concerns are primarily practical and action-oriented, NOT primarily 
highly technical/mathematical. We aim to provide the basis and beginning of a 
transparent tool to build insight. 
To the above end we first: 
• Emphasize discrete-time (e.g., daily time-step) difference-equation 
formulations rather than continuous-time classical differential equations, as in 
B&C and earlier. 
• Formulate deterministic models for an epidemic in a large nonhomogeneous 
population of individuals that can be implemented for quick numerical 
execution. 
2. A Deterministic/“Fluid” Model for Disease Transmission and Control 
Suppose there are H  individual and effectively isolated households or families. 
Assume temporarily and for simplicity that all households contain the same initial 
number of individuals, N. In this model an infected individual from any household can 
infect individuals in other households that have no infected individuals by interacting in 
the exterior world, that is a “marketplace,” transportation system, or even hospital or 
airport. We assume that the probability that several individuals within a household are 
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infected from outside the household is very small, and can be neglected (this can be 
generalized). When a household is newly infected, it has one infectious individual; other 
individuals in the household with the infectious person cannot be infected by others 
outside the household; the susceptible individuals in the household with an infectious 
individual are infected by infectious individuals within the household according to, for 
example, the classical S-I-R model of Kermack and McKendrick (Daley and Gani (1999) 
p. 28, also Banks and Castillo-Chavez (2003, Chapter 2)). Of course, other  
within-household epidemic models are possible, but are not treated here. Once an 
individual in a household has been infected, we can describe the subsequent spread of the 
disease within the household with the classical S-I-R epidemic model. 
2.1 Continuous-Time Model for the Within-Household Epidemic 
Let 
( );f i t  be the mean number of individuals infectious at time t in a household (or family); 
( );f s t  be the mean number of individuals susceptible at time t in a household; 
( );f r t  be the mean number of individuals removed (no longer infectious because of 
recovery or death) at time t in a household; once an individual is removed, the individual 
becomes immune: never becomes susceptible or infected again. 
The conventional differential equations for evolution of the disease in a 
representative household are as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
; ; ; ;
; ; ;
; ;
d f i t f i t f s t f i t
dt
d f s t f i t f s t
dt








    (2.1a) 
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with ( );0 1f i = , ( );0 1f s N= − , ( );0 0f r = . The parameters λ and µ are per-unit infection 
and recovery rates (here assumed constant, although they may realistically vary with time 
and environment, a realistic feature that can and should be considered in subsequent 
work. 
2.2 A Discrete-Time Model for the Within-Household Epidemic 
A discrete-time model for the evolution of the disease within a particular 
household is as follows; time steps can be in days. Let Ip  be the probability that a 
susceptible individual is infected by an infectious individual within a household during 
one (arbitrary, but fixed) time period; let Rp  be the probability that an infectious 
individual can no longer infect others, either because he/she recovers during such a time 
period, or dies. In the equations below 
( );F i t  is the mean number of infectious individuals in the household at time t; 
( );F s t  is the mean number of susceptible individuals in the household at time t; 
( );F r t  is the mean number of  individuals that were at one time infectious, but can no 
longer infect others in the household at time t; and 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
;
;
; 1 ; 1 ; 1 1
; 1 ; 1






F i t F i t p F s t p
F s t F s t p
F r t F r t F i t p
⎡ ⎤+ = − + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ = +
.   (2.1b) 
As before, ( ) ( ) ( );0 1; ;0 1; ;0 0,F i F s N F r= = − =  although other initial conditions are also 
possible; the mean time an individual is contagious is 1/ Rp . 
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2.3 The Two-Level Model 
 We call this type of epidemic model a compound model or two-level model. The 
two-level epidemic model reduces to a classical homogeneous mixing epidemic model if 
there is only one (large) household; this thus resembles the model of Kaplan, Craft, and 
Wein (2002). With more than one household, the disease is spread between households 
by homogeneous mixing. We assume that at most one individual in a household will be 
infected by an infectious individual from outside the household; that is, the chance of 
more than one individual within a household being infected by a person outside the 
household, i.e., in the “marketplace,” is negligible. The spread of the disease within a 
household with at least one infectious individual is governed by the homogenous mixing 
epidemic model within that household (omitting those household members that have been 
removed). This two-level epidemic model is most representative of diseases that are more 
likely to be spread among close individual contacts, (household or family members), than 
distant individual contacts, (outside of household or family). Ball and Lyne (2002) also 
use households to represent population nonhomogeneity. 
Individuals can be vaccinated; for the present, we assume the vaccination is 
perfect: 100% effective with no latency period. When a household is vaccinated, all 
members of the household are vaccinated. Some of the households may be pre-vaccinated 
before the outbreak of the disease. Let H  be the number of households whose members 
are all susceptible at the time the epidemic starts; these households have not been  
pre-vaccinated. The time until a household is vaccinated has an exponential distribution 
with mean V/H where V is the level of vaccination resource per time period, and H is the 
number of households that have not been pre-vaccinated; all individuals in a household 
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are vaccinated effectively simultaneously, on one visit by a vaccinator. Let time be 
measured discretely, say in terms of days. We will establish the convention that 
vaccination and tracing occur at the beginning of a day before individuals are possibly 
exposed to infectious individuals; other conventions are possible. State values are 
nonnegative real numbers. 
Fluid State Definitions 
( )0;I t% be the mean total number of infectious individuals at time t in households that have 
not been vaccinated. 
( )0;R t%  be the mean total number of individuals that have been infectious, but are no 
longer infectious at time t in households whose individuals have not been vaccinated. 
( )0;S t%  be the mean total number of individuals that are susceptible at time t in 
households whose individuals have not been vaccinated. 
( );I v t%  be the mean total number of infectious individuals in households whose 
individuals have been vaccinated at time t. 
( );R v t%  be the mean total number of individuals that have been infectious, but are no 
longer infectious in households that have been vaccinated at time t. 
( );S v t%  be the mean total number of individuals that were susceptible in households 
whose members have been vaccinated by time t. 
H  be the total number of households. 
H  be the number of households that have not been pre-vaccinated. 
( )0;vH t  be the mean number of households vaccinated by time t that never contained any 
infected individuals. 
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( )1; ;vH u t  be the mean number of households vaccinated by time t that acquired their first 
infected individual at time u<t. 
( )0;H t  be the mean number of households continually without infection and not 
vaccinated during (0,t]. 
( )1; ;H u t  be the mean number of households whose members have not been vaccinated 
by time t and acquired their first infected individual at time u<t. 
( )1; ;fH u t  be the mean number of households whose members are not vaccinated that 
acquired their first infected individual at time u<t and are traced or identified by time t. 
When a household is traced or identified, all the members of the household are removed 
from the population (isolated or quarantined) and no more susceptible members in the 
household are infected. An individual can be traced/identified by interviewing contacts of 
individuals who are known to have the disease. An individual can also be 
traced/identified if the individual seeks out health care because of media coverage that 
the disease is present. In the equations below, we adopt the convention that individuals 
are vaccinated and/or traced before being exposed to infectious individuals during a time 
period; other conventions are possible. Note that we are approximating the probability 
that a new household is vaccinated by not updating the number of households that have 
not been vaccinated at each time. 
( ) ( ) ( ) /0; 1 0; 0; 1 V Hv vH t H t H t e−⎡ ⎤+ = + −⎣ ⎦     (2.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) /1; ; 1 1; ; 1; ; 1 V Hv vH u t H u t H u t e−⎡ ⎤+ = + −⎣ ⎦   (2.3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) /; 10; 1 0; exp V Ho g i tH t H t eH Nλ −
⎧ + ⎫+ = −⎨ ⎬×⎩ ⎭
      (2.4) 
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Where ( );g i t  is the mean number of infected individuals in households that have 
not been traced at time t including those in vaccinated households; these individuals can 
infect individuals in households with no infected individuals; λo is the rate of infection of 
a member of a uninfected household by an outside infectious individual. 
A household with at least one infected individual can be traced. Let B be the effort 
expended for tracing; B may be the result of advertising the outbreak of the disease and 
encouraging individuals that think they have been exposed to seek help. Let Tp  be the 
conditional probability that a household with an infectious individual is recognized as 
such by tracing; the household is then assumed to be immediately removed from the 
population (quarantined). We establish the convention that a household is traced before it 
may be exposed to susceptible people. The mean number of households that are not 
vaccinated, were infected at time u<t, and are traced during (0, t+1] is 
( ) ( ) ( ) /1; ; 1 1; ; 1; ; 1 expV Hf f TBH u t H u t H u t e pH−
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫+ = + − −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦ .  (2.5) 
The number of households at time t+1 with its first individual infected at time u<t that 
have not been vaccinated or traced is 
( ) ( ) [ ]/1; ; 1 1; ; exp 1 exp 1V H TB BH u t H u t e pH H−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫+ = − + − − −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
.  (2.6) 
The mean number of households vaccinated at time t that acquired their first 
infected individual at time u<t is 
( ) ( ) ( )1; ; 1; ; 1; ; 1v v vh u t H u t H u t= − −    (2.7) 
for 0,1,2... 1u t= − . 
10 
If the continuous-time within-household epidemic (2.1a) is being used, and in the 
following f (i, t + 1 – u) is the solution of (2.1a), evaluated at integer time points, we 
write 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
0 0 0number number
households households
that have not vaccinated at 
been vaccinated time w 
with 1st infected with 1st infected
at time u at time u<w




g i t H u t f i t u h u w f i w u e
+ −
= = =





t wµ + −
14243 ,  (2.8a) 
where 1/ µ  is the mean time until an infectious individual stops being infectious; another 
model option is to quarantine all infectious people in a household. If the discrete-time 
epidemic model (2.1b) is used then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
0 0 0number number
households households
that have not vaccinated at 
been vaccinated time w 
with 1st infected with 1st infected
at time u at time u<w




g i t H u t F i t u h u w F i w u
+
= = =








1442443  (2.8b) 
( ) ( ) ( ) /; 11; 1, 1 0; 1 exp V Ho g i tH t t H t eH Nλ −
⎡ ⎤⎧ + ⎫+ + = − −⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬×⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
.  (2.9) 
If all infectious individuals are quarantined when a household is vaccinated, then the 
mean number of infected individuals that can infect others outside the household is 
( ) ( ) ( )0
0 number 
households
that are not vaccinated
with 1st infected
at time u
; 1 1; ; ; 1
t
u
g i t H u t f i t u
=
+ = + −∑ 14243 .   (2.10) 
In this case, 
( ) ( ) ( )0 /; 11; 1, 1 0; 1 exp V Ho g i tH t t H t eH Nλ −
⎡ ⎤⎧ + ⎫+ + = − −⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬×⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
.            (2.11) 
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If the continuous-time within-household epidemic model (2.1a) is used, then 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )







0; 1 1; ; 1 ; 1
0; 1 1; ; 1 ; 1 0; 1







I t H u t f i t u
S t H u t f s t u H t N







+ = + + −
+ = + + − + +







.  (2.12) 
Similar equations result if the discrete-time epidemic model (2.1b) is used. 
If the continuous-time within-household epidemic model (2.1a) is used, then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )









; 1 1; ; ;
; 1 1; ; ;












I v t h u w f i w u e
S v t h u w f s w u
R v t h u w f i w u e f r w u
µ
µ
















If the discrete-time within-household epidemic model (2.1b) is used, then 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )









; 1 1; ; ; 1
; 1 1; ; ;












I v t h u w F i w u p
S v t h u w F s w u







+ = − −
+ = −







.       (2.13b) 
When the continuous-time epidemic model (2.1a) is used, the number of individuals 
infected by the disease in (0,t] that will be killed by the disease is 
12 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




1; ; [ ; 1 ; 1 ]







K d t I t R t d
h u w f i w u v d f r w u v d
H u t f i t u f r t u d
κ




⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦
+ − ⎡ − ⎤ + − ⎡ − ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦





where ( )dκ  is the probability an infected individual is killed by the disease and ( )vκ  is 
the probability an individual is killed by the vaccine; a similar equation results if the 
discrete-time epidemic model (2.1b) is used. The mean number of individuals killed by 
vaccination is 
( ) ( ) ( )








K v t h u w N v






∑ ∑ .    (2.15) 
3. Numerical Examples 
Example 1: Disease is spread mainly through close contacts and the vaccination has  
life-threatening side effects. Smallpox is often spread through respiratory droplets;  
e.g., by an infectious individual coughing near one or more of the susceptibles. Most of 
the secondary cases are family members and healthcare workers. The average number of 
secondary cases per infected individual is here assumed to be 3.5 to 6. The fatality rate is 
about 30% in unvaccinated individuals. There is a vaccine for smallpox. The vaccine can 
have life-threatening complications; one estimate for death due to complications of the 
vaccine in the civilian population is the probability of 1.1x10–6 for people vaccinated for 




In the model, whose results appear below, there are 62 10×  households. Each 
household has 5 members. An individual that is infectious with smallpox displays visible 
symptoms and so we assume that the mean time a diseased individual is infectious is  
2 days before the person is quarantined. We use the continuous-time within-household 
epidemic model (2.1a) evaluated at integer times to represent the within-household 
progression of the disease. The daily rate at which an infected individual infects a 
susceptible in an all-susceptible household outside his/her household is 0 0.03λ = ; the rate 
at which a infectious individual infects a susceptible within his/her own family is 
0.03λ = ; with this infection rate, and one infected individual at time 0, the mean number 
of infected individuals within the household at time 50 is 4 with no intervention. The 
probability that an individual dies from the disease is 0.3. The probability with which a 
vaccinated individual dies from the vaccine is 1.1x10–6. When a household is vaccinated 
all infectious members of the household are removed from the population (quarantined); 
all susceptible individuals are vaccinated and become either immune or die from 
vaccination. Traced households with infectious individuals are assumed here to be 
identified as such with probability 1. Initially, there are 100 households; each with  
1 individual infected at time 0. The Table 1 displays model results at time 50 days. 
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Table 1 
Disease is spread mainly through close contacts and has a large probability of mortality. 























0 0 0 427 128 0 
0 0 100,000 257 77 0 
0 100,000 0 255 77 10 
20% 0 0 417 127 2 
20% 100,000 0 235 71 11 
Discussion: Individuals with this disease mainly infect those in the same household. The 
disease tends not to be transmitted to individuals outside of a household. As a result, 
tracing of households with infectious individuals is the most effective procedure to 
decrease the number of disease plus vaccination-caused fatalities; (pre-vaccination and 
vaccination in combination result in the smallest mean number killed by disease, but 
increase the number killed by vaccination). The probability of death due to vaccination is 
small; however, if many individuals are vaccinated, then deaths due to vaccination can be 
greater than the lives saved by vaccination. 
Example 2: The disease considered here is relatively easily spread outside of a 
household and is rarely fatal. The vaccine has few serious side effects. 
There are 62 10×  households. Each household has 5 members. The mean time a 
diseased individual is infectious is 2 days. The rate at which an infected individual infects 
someone outside his/her household is 0 0.5λ = ; the rate at which an infectious individual 
infects a susceptible within his/her own family is 0.5λ = . The probability that an 
individual dies from the disease is 0.07. The probability with which a vaccinated 
individual dies from the vaccine is 710− . When a household is vaccinated, all infectious 
15 
members of the household are removed from the population (quarantined); all susceptible 
individuals either become immune, or die from vaccination. Traced households with 
infectious members are identified correctly with probability 1. Initially, there are  
100 infected individuals at time 0; each one is in a different household. Table 2 displays 
model results at time 50 days. 
Table 2 
Disease spread through close and distant contacts. The vaccine has a small probability of 























0 0 0 4,250 305 0 
0 0 10,000 2,043 143 0 
0 10,000 0 1,105 77 1 
20% 0 0 1,886 132 0 
20% 10,000 0 832 58 1 
Discussion: The most effective disease control procedure is pre-vaccination and 
continuing vaccination. Vaccination alone without pre-vaccination results in almost 50% 
more infected individuals than vaccination with pre-vaccination. Tracing is not as 
effective as vaccination since it cannot isolate households before the disease is 
transmitted to individuals outside the household. However, it does reduce the number 
killed by disease by about one-half of those that die with no preventive treatment. The 
vaccine has few life-threatening side effects. Vaccination results in 1 additional fatality. 
4. Conclusions and Further Work 
 The above model has been implemented in Java by R. Simons and G. Bullock; 
Bullock and Simons (2004). The Java applet uses the discrete-time within-household 
epidemic model (2.1b). The model gives plausible comparisons of the effects of 
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controlling an outbreak of a disease by vaccination and tracing. Parameter values can be 
inserted and the resulting changes in the numbers of individuals in different states 
observed via the software GUI. 
Many generalizations and modifications can be made to the deterministic model. 
A few of them are: generalize the within-household epidemic model to include latency 
and other disease characteristics; modify the representation of vaccination to include a 
time until the vaccinated person is immune to the disease, and the vaccine is less than 
100% effective; introduce an initial time until the existence of the disease outbreak is 
known; represent a special category of people consisting of first responders and  
health-care workers and their families. Many other enhancements are possible. 
It is also important to develop stochastic models for control of epidemics in large 
populations that can be implemented for rapid numerical execution. Stochastic models 
would provide insight to decision makers concerning the robustness of control policies. 
Thus it is recommended that stochastic models, especially those that represent 
environmental variations through the transmission parameters (so-called  
“doubly stochastic” (Cox and Isham (1980))) be developed in subsequent work. 
17 
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